

Faire avancer la sûreté nucléaire

# Considering Safety Culture over the course of Supply Chain: IRSN's approach for R&D and expertise

**NEA-MDEP Supply Chain Workshop** 

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S. Beauquier, C. Poret


Human Organization Technology

Department

IRSN

## A research program on cross-functional organisations

- An IRSN interest for cross-functional organisations...
  - A cross-functional organisation involves actors from different trades, entities or even different companies who have to **achieve a common production** with different performance requirements (quality, safety, economic efficiency)



## **ORGANISATIONS**



Supply chain is a kind of cross-functional organisation (like process, workflow, etc.)

- Cross-functional organisations are found in different situations that the IRSN experts have to study: new build projects, maintenance projects, decommissioning projects, etc.
- ... and in the case of a supply chain, cross-cultural organisations
  - some supply chain actors are unfamiliar with the nuclear field and less easily integrate safety issues as a performance issue



## Results & research questions in progress

- Results issued from past research on cross-functional organisations
  - The overall performance does not result from the sum of the different performances at each step → field of phenomena that emerges at the collective, cross-functional & cross-cultural mesh
  - Maximization of the performance at the individual/local mesh can go against the overall performance
  - To support this overall/transversal performance, it is important to:
    - make the actors aware of the interdependencies between their contributions
    - make visible the common production as a whole. This helps to better understand the impact of an activity here and now on the overall performance, including safety
- Research questions in progress & possible locations for analyzing these questions
  - Domain of shipbuilding, in the context of a new build project which involves many subcontractors over a long period → relationships between client and subcontractors and how to improve these relationships that can be degraded, impacting common production in terms of quality (thus safety), economic efficiency, etc.
  - Domain of nuclear new build, where the construction of heavy components involves different actors from different professions → relationships between client, vendor, manufacturer and suppliers; awareness of safety goals over the course of Supply Chain



## Application to a recent study case



#### Context:

- 2015: detection of anomalies and non compliance of heavy components for NPP
- 2016: quality review on the manufacturing work carried out in the manufacture plant (external audit checks + a Multinational Evaluation Program)
- Inconsistencies, modifications or omissions in the production files, concerning manufacturing parameters or test results

### Root cause analysis:

- Control process
- Management & Organisation
- Technique



Contribute to a supply chain perspective

Action plan defined by the reviewers and the regulatory body on these dimensions



## Action plan for developing Safety Culture in the Supply Chain

Licensee (Client) Vendor Manufacturer Supplier (s)

Safety culture self-assessment & training
Protection of whistle-blowers

Attentivness to weak signals (« Manager in the Field » practices, « Weak signals » commitee)
Broken down barriers between hierarchies and departments

#### CLIENT/MANUFACTURER

Manufacturing inspection body Exchanges (visits in the field)

#### **MANUFACTURER/SUPPLIERS**

Actions limited to Quality control

Licensee (Client)



Vendor



Manufacturer



Supplier (raw material



Supplier

#### **CLIENT/VENDOR**

Safety Culture Expections in contractual documentation Control process

#### VENDOR/ MANUFACTURER

Resident inspectors
Unannounced inspections
Inspection guidance

#### REGULATORY BODY

Develop awareness of nuclear operators and manufacturers about safety culture issues
Improve the information of the Safety Authority by operators, manufacturers, whistle-blowers
Define procedures to deal with frauds



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#### CLIENT/MANUFACTURER

Manufacturing inspection body Exchanges (visits in the field) MANUFACTURER/SUPPLIERS

Actions limited to Quality control

Licensee (Client)



Engineering <u>(V</u>endor)



Manufacturer



Supplier (raw material



Supplier

CLIENT/VENDOR

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VENDOR/ MANUFACTURER

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## Assessing Safety Culture in the Supply Chain: IRSN's areas of interest

- Does the perception impact on safety of daily activities of manufacturer have been improved after the implentation of the action plan?
- Do the distributed contributions of the different actors in the supply chain contribute to a collective performance that goes beyond performance at every stage?
- Is safety built in the articulation between the different actors of the supply chain and not only from the risk management at each step?
- How do the different interdependencies impact overall performance, including safety?
- Are there any specific risks that emerge in each of these interdependencies?



# Thank you for your attention

